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Abstract— We present our recent results on using previously 
introduced framework for multi-area security assessment in 
large interconnections. The basic idea of the framework is 
exchanging just enough information so that each operator can 
evaluate the impact in his control area of contingencies both 
internal and external to his area. We provide illustrations 
based on a localization concept known as efficient bounding 
method and recently introduced approximate DC model of the 
European interconnected system. In this paper we focus on 
four transmission system operators (within the approximate 
DC model): Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands (for 
both Summer and Winter-peak load conditions). 
 
Index Terms— Security assessment, information exchange, 
multi-area large interconnection, black-box equivalent. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ARGE interconnected power systems are usually 
decomposed into areas based on various criteria and the 
operation and control of the whole interconnection is shared 
by Transmission Systems Operators (TSOs) responsible for 
their respective areas. To keep the security of the whole 
interconnection on desired level, a higher level of 
coordination among TSOs is required [1]-[3]. Efficient 
coordination among TSOs requires an efficient information 
exchange. Different approaches have been considered or are 
under consideration aiming to a higher level of coordination 
among different TSOs.  
In North America the approach is to create higher level 
operational entities (RTOs or Mega-RTOs) that act as the 
coordinator of the lower level TSOs over very large 
geographical areas [1]-[3]. 
From the European perspective it is not (at least presently 
and in near future) possible to set up a transnational security 
coordinator that would have authority to handle security 
assessment over the whole or part of the European 
interconnection.  
There is a strong impediment towards information 
exchange among different actors of the European energy 
sector. Indeed, for several reasons, the European electric 
power industries have traditionally been very cautious in 
terms of confidentiality and security of technical 
information about their system. Nevertheless, there are some 
ongoing efforts towards the standardization of operation 
policies and practices summarized in UCTE Operation 
Handbook [4]. 
In our previous work [5] we introduced a framework for 
information exchange and security analysis suitable for 
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distributed multi-area security assessment and control in 
large interconnections operated by a team of TSOs. In this 
framework, each TSO is committed to compute the effect of 
his internal contingencies on line flows and voltages in his 
area and on current flows in all the interconnections 
between all control areas of the system. Each TSO is also 
committed to provide to all other TSOs an up to date 
equivalent model of its internal area that allows one to 
compute voltages at the terminal buses of all its 
interconnections from current injections in these latter. 
Furthermore, each TSO is committed to use the detailed 
model of his area so as to compute the internal state of its 
area when subjected to the post-contingency flows in the 
interconnections as they are computed by the other TSOs 
for their own internal contingencies, and to inform the other 
TSOs of any internal violations due to external 
contingencies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
briefly presents the multi-area security assessment 
framework; Section III presents the results obtained using 
efficient bounding method and approximate (DC) model of 
the European Interconnection and Section IV offers some 
conclusions. 
II.  MULTI-AREA SECURITY ASSESSEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The framework was introduced and discussed in [5]. To 
make this text self-contained we repeat main features of the 
framework. The framework defines an information 
exchange scheme to allow each area to: carry out security 
assessment locally and appreciate security level of whole 
interconnection. 
When a TSO runs his static security assessment package, 
say to simulate the tripping of one of his lines (including his 
interconnections with his neighbors), the detailed results 
concerning his own system will be displayed to him only. If 
the contingency leads to internal violations, he should 
however inform the other TSOs that there is a problem. On 
the other hand, if this contingency creates violations on 
interconnection lines, all the operators should be aware 
about the detailed consequences. Furthermore, if the 
contingency creates problems inside any other area, these 
should also be detected and analyzed in detail. In this case 
also, all TSOs should be aware of the fact that there is a 
problem whose solution needs cooperation between the 
operators. A theoretical solution to this problem is to share 
completely all real-time SCADA information and power 
system models, and to oblige each TSO to run its security 
assessment package by using the complete model of the 
whole interconnection when analyzing the effects of his 
internal contingencies and interconnection losses. However, 
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this solution is technically expensive if not impossible and 
hindered by confidentiality issues. 
The framework relies on the exchange of minimal 
amounts of information, while still achieves the above 
requirements. Therefore, instead of using detailed models 
requiring detailed data exchange, it is based on the 
exchange of equivalent models. For the purpose of static 
security assessment, an equivalent model of an area is a 
black-box model of the voltage-current relationship at the 
receiving ends of the interconnections of that area, which 
can be plugged into a power flow computation. 
The good quality equivalent models can in principle be 
computed in real-time by each area TSO, using the SCADA 
measurements, topology processor and state-estimation 
software available in his EMS platform, and that in principle 
it can also be packaged in such a way that no detailed 
information about the area is exchanged, other than what is 
strictly required from a physical points of view to model 
voltage/current relationships at the terminals. 
The framework provides incentives for good quality 
equivalents, since: 
• each TSO has the possibility to check quality of 
equivalents, by plugging his detailed model, computing 
interconnection currents, and comparing with 
“equivalent” information published by others; 
• providing a good quality equivalent of one’s area to 
other TSOs is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
being able to predict correctly the impact of external 
contingencies on one’s area. 
The TSOs can collect information about the interface (to 
other subsystems) variables and they could also enrich these 
measurements by providing measurements corresponding to 
a richer set of simulated conditions. Using such datasets, it 
would in principle be possible to construct, by supervised 
learning, synthetic input-output models relating the steady-
state of input signals to those of outputs. 
A.  Security assessment decomposition 
From the viewpoint of each particular TSO there are 
three types of contingencies: 
• Internal contingency in its own area (loss of line or 
generator, etc.) 
• External contingency to its area (a contingency internal 
to another area) 
• Outage of an interconnection line (anywhere in the 
overall system, i.e. not just those directly connected to 
the particular area) 
There are two types of effects: 
• Internal effects (currents and voltages in particular area, 
subsequent to contingency occurrence) 
• External effects (active/reactive current flows through 
all the interconnections, subsequent to contingency 
occurrence) 
Computation of effects (within the framework) is as 
follows: 
• Internal contingency or interconnection trip: use 
detailed model of own area and interconnections plus 
equivalent models of other areas. 
• External contingency: use detailed model of own area 
plus post-contingency interconnection currents 
computed by area of origin of this external contingency. 
B.  Information exchange protocol 
The TSO of each area posts on the “Web”: 
1. An equivalent model of his area, 
2. Results of his own security analysis: 
 For each internal contingency considered: 
- likelihood of the contingency,  
- summary of internal effects (e.g. harmless vs. 
harmful) 
- detailed external effects (i.e. post-contingency 
currents in all the interface lines of the whole 
interconnection) 
 For each external contingency considered: 
- summary of internal effects (e.g. harmless vs. 
harmful) 
 For each interconnection contingency considered: 
- Detailed external effects and summary of 
internal effects  
All information that has changed since the last update must 
be posted as soon as possible. Computations must be done 
to respond to new information (internal or external) within 
deadline. All information about all interconnections 
(measured or computed) should be considered as common 
information inside the team of TSOs. Actually, each TSO 
should be committed to compute the effect of the tripping of 
any interconnection using the detailed model of his own 
area and the equivalent models provided by the other areas. 
This means that the contingencies related to the loss of 
interconnections are computed several times and that the 
resulting post-contingency flows over the remaining 
interconnections are shared information. All TSOs could 
anticipate any problem that could appear on any 
interconnection, and if the equivalent models are of good 
quality, the information computed by all the TSOs about all 
the interconnections will be coherent. 
III.  RESULTS USING EFFICIENT BOUNDING METHOD 
Since many contingencies present rather localized 
effects, the above scheme would lead to many useless 
computations. In order to exploit the local nature of many 
contingencies each TSO could publish “safe bounds” on his 
area. All TSOs would then publish only those external 
effects that fall outside of the “safe bounds” of at least one 
other area. This would allow a significant reduction of the 
computational burden related to the computation by each 
area of internal effects of external contingencies and the 
amount of information to share. 
In the worst case, each TSO has to compute the detailed 
impact on his system of all contingencies internal or 
external, and in the worst case the computational burden for 
each such computation is equivalent to using a complete 
detailed model. If necessary, parallel computations can be 
used to speed up response times, e.g. by running several 
contingency sets in parallel. However, from the 
maintenance and monitoring point of view this is concerned 
by the details of only this system. 
We provide illustrations based on a localization concept 
known as bounding [6,7]. Bounding methods are based on 
engineering observation that many power system 
contingencies have a local impact. This was first recognized 
and efforts undertaken to take advantage of this fact in [8] 
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where the concept of concentric relaxation was introduced. 
Next, powerful concept of bound estimates was presented in 
[9]. These concepts were further extended in [6,7]. We 
suggest and use the bounding method within the framework 
for several reasons and main being: 
• The localization is inherent to the proposed framework 
and the bounding method fits well to it, 
• Bounding method will further ease computational 
burden within the framework, 
• We determine the upper bounds for individual TSOs 
based on the idea of bounding technique [6]. 
To make this text self-contained a brief description of the 
efficient bounding technique [6] (for the case of a single 
branch outage) is given below. 
A.  Efficient Bounding method 
The bounding methods [6,7] have important attributes 
that render this approach, in contingency analysis, superior 
with respect to others. The method is very efficient for 
detecting line MW flow violations and is based on DC 
(linear incremental) power flow model that is expressed (for 
a system with  buses) by the following matrix equation, n
 
PB Δ=Δθ'                                      (1) 
 
where PΔ  is -dimensional vector of changes in real 
power injections, 
n
θΔ  is -dimensional vector of changes 
in bus angle, and  is  susceptance matrix. The effect 




θΔ , and calculating the resulting changes in line flows 
as (for the line km ) [6], 
 
kmmkkm xP /)( θθ Δ−Δ=Δ                       (2) 
 
where  is the reactance of the line km . The total post-
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where  is pre-contingency MW flow. 0kmP
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the entire network is divided into 




Fig. 1 A network partition in bounding method 
 
During the procedure the N1 sub-network, which 
initially contains only the terminal buses of the outaged 
branch (k and m), is progressively extended by including 
nodes from N3; on the other hand N3 is always composed 
of the boundary buses that separate the sub-network N1 
from the remainder of the system model contained in N2. 
The iterative procedure building up the three sub-networks 
ends as soon as it is possible to ensure that no flow violation 
outside N3 may occur. The effects of the branch outage are 
modeled by a pair of equal but opposite injections at buses k 
and m. The efficient bounding method is based on 
incremental flow criterion [6]: 
The maximum incremental active power flow in any 
branch in N2 cannot exceed the incremental flow entering 
that sub-network, 
or incremental angle criterion [6]: 
The incremental angular spread across any branch in N2 
cannot exceed the maximum incremental spread between 
the boundary buses. 
The incremental angle criterion has several advantages 
over incremental flow criterion [6] and we use it in our 
illustrations. The main advantage in using this criterion is 
the fact it can be diminished, unlike incremental flow 
criterion, by expanding N1 even if the expansion does not 
add any closed loops to N1 [6]. The central idea of efficient 
bounding technique is to expand sub-network N1 and 
diminish incremental angle criterion until it becomes less 
than minimal angular spread over the lines in sub-network 
N2 (set of endangered lines in N2 is empty). In this way the 
sub-network (N1+N3) that is affected by particular line 
outage and that should be analyzed with more scrutiny is 
identified. 
The effect of branch outage in efficient bounding method 
is modeled by a pair of appropriately scaled injections at the 
buses at the both ends of the line. It can be shown rigorously 
that [6], within assumptions of the linearized (DC) model, 
the maximum incremental flow in any line in particular sub-
network cannot exceed the incremental flow entering or 
leaving that sub-network. Consequently, the flows have to 
be calculated only for branches endangered by the boundary 
flow [6]. This is the main argument around which the 
efficient bounding method is built. We use the same 
argument to define the upper bounds for every sub-system in 
the network, as discussed in next sub-section. 
B.  Results 
We take advantage of the availability of the IEEE 
Common Data Format (CDF) [10] for the recently 
introduced approximate model of European interconnected 
system [11].  
 
 
Fig. 2 European Interconnected System 
 
The system is shown in Fig. 2. and includes 1254 buses, 
378 generators, 17 areas (TSOs) , and 28 cross-border 
Flows between N2 and N3
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In our illustrations we suppose that every individual TSO 
uses efficient bounding technique in order to ease 
computational burden. Two CDF files [10,11] are used for 
the system corresponding to Summer 2002 and Winter-peak 
2002 loading conditions. Available DC model has been 
particularly tailored for the study of cross-border trades and 
consequently considerable work had to be done in order to 
make this model useful for security assessment. The limits 
of the lines are not available in any of CDF files used 
(except for the tie-lines, however some of the tie-lines were 
already tuned to be congested). First effort undertaken was 
to put a reasonable MW limit for all lines with main goal of 
having feasible system conditions in base-case and 
reasonable values of safe bounds in every sub-system (in 
this paper we focus on four TSOs: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Netherlands) for both Summer and Winter-peak 
load conditions. After having the feasible system state for 
both Summer and Winter-peak load conditions the safe 
bounds are calculated for each of the sub-systems of 
interest. Safe bounds of each sub-system are calculated as, 
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where  is the MW flow limit on the line l ,  the 
flow on the same line in base-case (pre-contingency),  is 
line reactance, and  is the number of the lines in the sub-
system. This safe bound corresponds to the minimum 
changes in phase difference across the lines in the system 
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The results of safe bounds determination are summarized 
in Table I. 
 
TABLE  I 
SAFE BOUNDS 
Load conditions Belgium France Germany Netherlands 
Summer 0.0271 0.0277 0.0187 0.0173 
Winter-peak 0.0153 0.0123 0.0116 0.0142 
 
Following the same reasoning and argument of the efficient 
bounding method [6], the upper bound (maximal angular 
spread) for every sub-system in the network can be 
determined as maximal angular spread over boundary buses 
of the sub-system (see illustration in Fig. 3 and equation 
(6)). Fig. 3 illustrates how (as an example) Netherlands TSO 
performs security assessment in its own system and how 
determines for each particular contingency the upper bound 
in changes of phase angles for German TSO. This upper 
bound is determined as maxumum change of phase angles 
among all buses (within Germany) through which German 
system is connected with the rest of the whole system 
(bulleted buses in Fig. 3). 
For each contingency inside Netherlands internal effects as 
well as upper bound for German TSO are calculated. The 
upper bound is calculated as, 
 
minmax
jiUB θθ Δ−Δ=                          (6) 
 
where  stands for upper bound,  is maximum 
angle change (with respect to the base-case value) among all 
buses connecting German TSO to the rest of the system 
(supposed in the equation to happen at bus ) and  is 
minimum angle change (with respect to the base-case value) 
among all buses connecting German TSO to the rest of the 
system (supposed in the equation to happen at bus ). Each 
contingency for which upper bound exceeds posted safe 





The results of contingency assessment for all four TSOs 
of interest are summarized in Tables II and III. Table II 
gives total number of contingencies, those declared as 
internally harmless and harmful as well as those declared 
potentially harmful for other TSOs for both Summer and 
Winter-peak load conditions. External equivalent for each 
TSO is taken as the exact DC model of all other TSOs in the 
system. Table III presents the results of assessment of each 
contingency declared as potentially externally harmful by 
every TSO performed by every TSO to which the 














Fig. 3 Illustration of upper bound determination 
 
TABLE  II 
CONTINGENCIES SUMARY (SUMMER/WINTER-PEAK) 
Contingencies Belgium France Germany Netherlands 

































TABLE  III 
POTENTIALLY EXTERNAL HARMFUL CONTINGENCIES AS ASSESSED BY 
OTHER TSO 
- Belgium France Germany Netherlands 


























Observe that all line outages within every TSO are 
considered as contingencies augmented by all 
interconnection lines in the system not directly connected to 







are: 6 for Belgium (interconnection lines between Germany 
and Netherlands and Germany and France, see Fig. 3), 7 for 
France, 8 for Germany, and 7 for Netherlands.  
The results in Table III are in the following format: 
Potentially harmful/Harmful (no brackets correspond to 
Summer and within brackets to Winter-peak load 
conditions). 
It is interesting to note that most of internal contingencies 
in Belgian and Dutch TSO are also potentially externally 
harmful to other TSOs. This is even intuitively clear since 
both of the sub-systems are relatively small as compared to 
French or German system. Also, by inspection of the data in 
available CDF files [10,11] it is clear that Dutch system is 
heavily loaded (with high flows on the lines) even during 
Summer conditions. Similar observation holds for Belgian 
TSO. Contrary to this, small fractions of contingencies 
within French and German TSOs are declared as potentially 
externally harmful. Note also, that most of contingencies 
inside Belgian or Dutch TSO are also declared finally as 
harmful by other TSOs but this is not the case with French 
and German TSOs. 
For each contingency declared as externally potentially 
harmful, a TSO that computes effect of such a contingency 
does not need the model of the TSO declared the 
contingency potentially harmful. In this case, the TSO just 
adjust inputs from other TSO based on the posted violation 
of its safe bounds calculated by other TSO. 
C.  Discussion 
Static security assessment is considered in this paper 
together with efficient bounding method. In principle, other 
bounding concepts that permit consideration of other system 
limits then line MW (e.g., complete bounding method [12]) 
could be also used within the framework. The idea can also 
be extended to dynamic security assessment by replacing 
the external equivalents by dynamic equivalents and posting 
post-contingency dynamics of interconnection flows rather 
than steady state values. In this context a dynamic 
equivalent is a black-box model of an area which allows one 
to compute dynamics of voltages from dynamics of current 
injections (or vice versa) and which can be plugged into a 
dynamic security assessment package. Notice that the idea 
of safe bounds also carries over in principle to the dynamic 
case. While static equivalents can in principle be computed 
in real-time with present technology, the issue of computing 
good quality dynamic equivalents deserves further research. 
Some research considerations in constructing the dynamic 
equivalents through artificial neural networks are reported 
in [13,14]. 
We intend to use supervised learning to synthesize input-
output models relating the steady-state (or dynamics) of 
input signals to those of outputs, in our future research. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The results of using efficient bounding method within 
recently introduced multi-area security assessment 
framework, are presented in this paper. In this paper it is 
demonstrated using approximate model (DC) of the 
European Interconnected System. The choice of efficient 
bounding method is based on the observation that this 
localization concept fits well into the framework, while the 
choice of the European Interconnected System is based on 
the fact that the framework is perfectly coherent with actual 
collaborative nature of system wide operation in Europe, 
needs only a minimal amount of information sharing and is 
not very demanding in terms of communication 
infrastructures.  We also believe that the framework 
together with efficient bounding method could also be 
considered as an approach to handle security assessment in 
North-American Mega-RTOs, where it could help to 
circumvent problems of scalability of algorithms and 
maintainability of data by distributing them over the TSOs 
under the authority of the Mega-RTO [15]. 
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